

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: HOW RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES USE DIPLOMATIC COVER IN CZECH TERRITORY



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SUMMARY

- As of June 2020, **136 Russian representatives** were accredited on Czech territory. Half are **intelligence officers and serve in SVR** (the civilian intelligence agency), GRU (military-intelligence agency), and the counter-intelligence FSB unit.
- Russian intelligence officers **exploit their Czech accreditation for activities in other EU and NATO countries**, impeding efforts to identify and monitor them.
- **The Russian Federation has about twice as many diplomats in the Czech Republic as the Czech Republic has in Russia.** Roughly 60 people represent Czechia in Russia, and 30 of them are diplomats. Moscow has a similarly asymmetric delegation in Poland, which is more geopolitically important and four times larger than the Czech Republic.
- There are more Russian diplomatic cars than diplomatists. As BIS pointed out in 2019, the cars are used for espionage operations.
- Russian intelligence officers posing as diplomats:
 - establish contacts with Czech citizens who are convinced that they are dealing with diplomats, forging an **involuntary, abusive connection with Czech citizens**
 - seek out **contacts with Czech MPs, their assistants, and staff members of various political parties in Parliament**
 - directly control **several Czech producers of disinformation and extremists**
 - **assemble psychological profiles of Czech citizens for future recruitment.** For instance, the Russian intelligence officer Richard Rachardzho was involved in such activities
- It is often said that Russian activities are best monitored within the walls of an embassy. But today the **ambassadorial residency is too bloated for supervision.**
- The Czech Republic does sometimes expel Russian diplomats or does not extend their residence visas. Between 2010 and 2020, according to information in the public domain, **18 diplomats were either expelled or their staff terminated.**
- Czech authorities can take two steps for securer diplomacy:
 - **Expel all Russian diplomats from Czech territory**, except for the ambassador and his driver.
 - Negotiate a reasonable delegation once Russia threatens to retaliate. **The best scenario sees only one more person in each embassy.**
 - **Russia has much to lose through the eviction of its clandestine agents**, but the Czech Republic is far from economically dependent on the Russian Federation, the terminus for a mere 2% of Czech exports.
- In 1971, the United Kingdom set a precedent, expelling 105 Soviet informants, which **destroyed Soviet intelligence operations in Britain for the following two decades.**

Russian intelligence officers work under diplomatic cover at the embassy in Prague and at consulates general in Brno and Karlovy Vary.



1. IS THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY WORKING AS A RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY?

- As in other states, Russian intelligence officers work under diplomatic cover at Russian diplomatic missions at the Prague embassy and at the consulates-general in Brno and Karlovy Vary.¹ Their diplomatic status grants them protection from t thus, if they are exposed engaging in hostile, illegal activities, they will not face trial and imprisonment but only expulsion from the Czech territory.
- Among these “diplomats” are individuals that have been previously expelled from other countries for illicit activities incompatible with their diplomatic status.²
- They further **cooperate with members of the Russian intelligence agencies that do not have diplomatic covers**³ and who came to the Czech Republic as tourists, academics, journalists, business people, or the Russian diaspora.⁴
- Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover often conduct intelligence operations without diplomatic cover, for example in other European countries, as working outside the country where they are accredited makes identification and monitoring them difficult.

Which Russian intelligence services in the Czech Republic operate under diplomatic cover?

- The SVR (civilian intelligence agency) and GRU (military-intelligence agency), as well as the counter-intelligence service FSB.⁵

1 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2004,” BIS, 1. 6. 2005, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/vyrocní-zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2004.pdf>

2 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2006,” BIS, 21. 11. 2007, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2006-vz-cz.pdf>

3 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2003,” BIS, 1. 6. 2004, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/vyrocní-zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2003.pdf>

4 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2013,” BIS, 4. 11. 2014, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2013-vz-cz.pdf>

5 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2003,” BIS, 1. 6. 2004, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/vyrocní-zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2003.pdf>

1. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WORKING UNDER AN OFFICIAL COVER IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC?

- As of May 2020,⁶ the Russian Federation had 51 diplomats and 87 administrative and technical staff members (also with diplomatic status). The majority of them are also here with their families.⁷ On June 5, 2020, the Czech government deported⁸ Andrey Konchakov and one staff member with a service passport (Igory Rybakov). It decreased **the number of Russian officials on Czech territory with diplomatic protection to 136.**
- The share of active Russian intelligence officers posing as Russian diplomats under diplomatic cover has been continuously large, as confirmed by the Czech BIS counterintelligence agency.⁹ It found that **intelligence operatives constitute up to half of all Russian diplomatic staff in the Czech Republic.**¹⁰
- **The Czech Republic is a bastion for Russian operations in other EU and NATO countries** and is unsurprisingly hosts more staff than delegations in other EU states.¹¹ The Czech Republic consequently tolerates hostile operations against our allies. It is relatively easy for Czech intelligence officers to track Russian operatives on Czech territory, but once they cross the border into, for instance, Germany, that country's counterintelligence takes over. It is difficult to transfer responsibilities due to the sensitivity and speed of such operations, and the travellers take full advantage of the integrity of personal effects promised by the Schengen rules.¹²
- **The Russian Federation has about twice as many diplomats in the Czech Republic as the Czech Republic has in Russia.**¹³ Only 60 Czechs-30 of whom are diplomats-man the embassy in Moscow. Moscow has a similarly large representation in Poland, which is not only more geopolitically significant, but also four times larger than the Czech Republic.
- Overall, the diplomatic representation of the Russian Federation (embassy and general consulates combined) is the largest of any country with a mission in the Czech Republic, dwarfing even the U.S. and China).¹⁴

6 Čerstvá čísla z ruské ambasády, HlídacíPes.org, 18.5.2020, WWW: <https://hlidacipes.org/cerstva-cisla-z-ruske-ambasady-kreml-ma-v-cesku-51-diplomatu-a-87-clenu-personalu/>

7 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2005“, BIS, 1. 9. 2005, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/vyrocní-zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2005.pdf>

8 Řevnivost ruských diplomatů skončila mezinárodním skandálem, Deník N, Petra Procházková a Lukáš Prchal, 5.6.2020, WWW: <https://denikn.cz/374777/revnivost-ruskych-diplomatu-skoncila-mezinarodnim-skandalem-kdo-jsou-dva-muzi-ktere-babis-vyhostil-z-ceska/?ref=tit>

9 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2013“, BIS, 4. 11. 2014, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2013-vz-cz.pdf>

10 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2005“, BIS, 1. 9. 2005, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/vyrocní-zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2005.pdf>

11 „BIS a centrála proti organizovanému zločinu rozbily síť ruských zpravodajců“, Aktuálně, 21. 10. 2019, <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/bis-a-cetrala-proti-organizovanemu-zlocilu-loni-rozbyly-sit-r~66e17690f3e511e982ef0cc47ab5f122/>

12 Jak jedním tahem ochromit ruskou špiónáž v Česku“, Aktuálně, 26.5.2020, <http://blog.aktualne.cz/blogy/pohled-zblizka.php?itemid=36948>

13 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2009“, BIS, 16. 6. 2010, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2009-vz-cz.pdf>

14 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2015“, BIS, 1. 9. 2016, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2015-vz-cz.pdf>

- **The number of official state cars with diplomatic license plates that service the Russian diplomacy in the Czech Republic is even higher than the number of accredited diplomats.** There are around 70 official vehicles, and another 30 are available to Russian diplomats for private purposes. The Czech authorities cannot inspect diplomatic cars,¹⁵ and the Russian state uses them to transport espionage equipment.¹⁶ According to the Czech intelligence services, such high numbers represent a considerable security risk for the Czech Republic.¹⁷
- The following map¹⁸ marks the magnitude of Russian diplomatic real estate in Prague:



Ruské objekty v Praze

autor:
HlídacíPes.org

¹⁵ „Ruských diplomatických aut je v Česku víc než diplomatů. Škrtat se je nedaří“, 12. 2. 2019, <https://hlidacipes.org/ruskych-diplomatickych-aut-je-v-cesku-vic-nez-diplomatu-skrtat-se-je-nedari/>

¹⁶ „BIS a centrála proti organizovanému zločinu rozbily síť ruských zpravodajců“, Aktuálně, 21. 10. 2019, <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/bis-a-cetrala-proti-organizovanemu-zlocilu-loni-rozbyly-sit/~66e17690f3e511e982ef0cc47ab5f122/>

¹⁷ „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2018“, BIS, 26. 11. 2019, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2018-vz-cz.pdf.pdf>

¹⁸ „Pražská Bubenec jako malá Moskva. Zmapovali jsme majetek Ruské federace v Česku“, Hlídací pes, 9.7.2017, <http://hlidacipes.org/prazska-bubenec-jako-mala-moskva-zmapovali-majetek-ruske-federace-cesku/>

2. WHAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORKING ON UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER?

- Establishing contacts with Czech citizens convincing them that they are dealing with diplomats. Czechs are left exploited or recruited to forward espionage.^{19,20} Of course, interference in internal affairs is incompatible with their diplomatic status.²¹
- The poseur Russian intelligence officers find **contacts with Czech MPs, their assistants, and staff members of various political parties in Parliament**²² to conduct political and military intelligence activities.
- In recent years, they have been **directly controlling several Czech producers of disinformation and extremists**.²³
- Czech nuclear, chemical, and other research²⁴ and innovation projects²⁵ for biohazard control and dangerous substances are in jeopardy of economic and scientific-technical espionage.²⁶
- Obtaining unclassified information is the focus. Russian intelligence officers collect individual snippets of publicly available information or information from open sources to gain an insight into a particular area or issue.²⁷ Such examples are relationships between different Czech actors and representatives or their attributes that serve **to create their psychological profiles** and future recruitment. Such activities were carried out in the Czech Republic, for instance, by the Russian intelligence officer Richard Rachardzho.
- Russian intelligence services are interested in the expatriate community. Some outreach is difficult to cultivate because they are in opposition to the current Russian political system, while another is already well assimilated and rooted in the Czech environment. The aim is to either neutralize them or use them in operations designed to exert Russian influence on Czech territory.²⁸

19 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2017,” BIS, 3. 12. 2018, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2017-vz-cz.pdf>

20 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2006,” BIS, 21. 11. 2007, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2006-vz-cz.pdf>

21 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2010,” BIS, 7. 9. 2011, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2010-vz-cz.pdf>

22 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2008,” BIS, 31. 8. 2009, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2008-vz-cz.pdf>

23 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2018,” BIS, 26. 11. 2019, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2018-vz-cz.pdf.pdf>

24 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2008,” BIS, 31. 8. 2009, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2008-vz-cz.pdf>

25 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2006,” BIS, 21. 11. 2007, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2006-vz-cz.pdf>

26 „Výroční zpráva o činnosti Vojenského zpravodajství za rok 2008,” VZ, přístup 20.

5. 2020, <https://vzcr.cz/uploads/41-Vyrocní-zprava-2008.pdf>

27 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2017,” BIS, 3. 12. 2018, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2017-vz-cz.pdf>

28 „Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za rok 2010,” BIS, 7. 9. 2011, <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2010-vz-cz.pdf>



A larger number of Czech specialists would be needed for the professional monitoring of the Russian intelligence officer.

3. ISN'T IT BETTER TO HAVE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS "UNDER SUERVEILLANCE" AT THE EMBASSY AND CONSULATES THAN TO EXPEL THEM?

- It is often said that it is better to keep Russian operatives at the embassy as their activities are then more easily monitored. But the embassy is so overstaffed that **it cannot be monitored** unless more Czech specialists are brought in. At present, the police and other security officers, who should be pursuing everyday crime, are stretched too thin to survey diplomatic property.
- The work of a Russian intelligence officer without a diplomatic cover is significantly more dangerous and demands more attention than those formally registered. **Therefore, it is in the interest of the Czech Republic to make Russian espionage activities significantly more strenuous and expensive.**

4. EXAMPLES OF EXPULSION OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OPERATING IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER

- The Czech Republic occasionally expels Russian diplomats or lets their residence visas lapse. In most cases, the reasons behind such actions are not publicly stated.²⁹ The Russian side always reacts reciprocally.³⁰ Here are some publicly known examples:
 - In January 2000, according to press sources, an assistant of a Russian military attaché had to leave the Czech Republic. He was reportedly cajoling information about NATO technologies from government officials who had access to sensitive data.³¹
 - In the spring of 2005, military counterintelligence ordered a Russian diplomat out of the country. The incendiary was establishing contacts with the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.³²
 - In August 2009, the deputy of a military attaché to the Russian Embassy was expelled. The Czech authorities advised another diplomat not to return from his vacation. Military intelligence services have reportedly obtained information revealing that both envoys appeared to be working for Russia's intelligence services.³³

29 „České tajné služby odhalily tři ruské špiony,” Respekt, 12. 3. 2015, <https://www.respekt.cz/fokus/ceske-tajne-sluzby-odhalily-tri-ruske-spiony>

30 „Počet ruských diplomatů v Česku jsme možná měli řešit už v devadesátých letech, míní Petříček,” ČT24, 27. 11. 2019, <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2988728-pocet-ruskych-diplomatu-v-cesku-j sme-mozna-meli-resit-uz-v-devadesatych-letech-mini>

31 „Česko už vyhostilo diplomaty kvůli špionáži i politice. A bývá to fofr,” iDnes, 26.3.2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/diplomacie-vyhosteni-agenti-diplomate-rusko-irak-skrival.A180326_153202_domaci_jn

32 PŘEHLEDNĚ: Česko má s vyhošťováním diplomatů zkušenosti, nejčastěji s Rusy, iDNES.cz, 5.6.2020, WWW: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/prehledne-vyhosteni-diplomatu-historie-cesko-ambasada-ruska-federace-irak.A200605_143927_domaci_chtl

33 „Česko už vyhostilo diplomaty kvůli špionáži i politice. A bývá to fofr,” iDnes, 26.3.2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/diplomacie-vyhosteni-agenti-diplomate-rusko-irak-skrival.A180326_153202_domaci_jn

- According to information from Neovlivni.cz, between 2010 and 2014, eleven Russian staff members were expelled, of which five were expelled in 2012 and three in 2014.³⁴
- In 2015, the Czech state intervened against three Russian intelligence officers. One “visited Prague temporarily from another country he was working in,” another one worked at the Russian embassy in Prague, and the third was heading to Prague on a mission. There were no formal deportations, the Czech state decided not to extend their visas, and in the case of the third person, a Czech resident permit was not issued.³⁵
- In 2018, three undeclared Russian intelligence personnel were deported as part of a coordinated action in response to the attempt to poison Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom.³⁶
- In June 2020, the Czech government expelled two members of the FSB: accredited diplomat Andre Konchakov and a holder of a service passport Igor Rybakov. Both operated under the auspices of the Russian Center for Science and Culture.

34 DATABÁZE LŽÍ: MILOŠ ZEMAN A ŽÁDNÝ ODHALENÝ ŠPIÓN, Neovlivni.cz, 2.4.2019, WWW: <https://neovlivni.cz/databaze-lzi-milos-zeman-a-zadny-odhaleni-spioni/>

35 ČESKÉ TAJNÉ SLUŽBY ODHALILY TŘI RUSKÉ ŠPIONY, Respekt.cz, 12. 3. 2015, WWW: <https://www.respekt.cz/fokus/ceske-tajne-sluzby-odhalily-tri-ruske-spiony>

36 „Česko vyhostí tři ruské špiony jako reakci na otrávení agenta Skripala,” Respekt, 26. 3. 2018, <https://www.respekt.cz/politika/cesko-vyhosti-tri-ruske-spiony-jako-reakci-na-otraveni-agenta-skipala>

In 2019, the Czech authorities (BIS together with the National Center against Organized Crime) dismantled the intelligence network created by the Russian FSB.



5. ARE SOME OF THE RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC WORKING FOR RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES?

- In 2006, the accreditation of RIA Novosti reporter Leonid Sviridov was not extended. He later worked as a correspondent in Warsaw, but was expelled from there in 2014 at the request of the local counterintelligence service ABW.³⁷
- In 2016, the accreditations of two Russian journalists were not renewed:³⁸ Alexandra Kuranova from the news agency Rossia Sevodnia and Vladimir Snegirev of Vechernyaya Moskva. Due to the sensitivity of the case, the Czech diplomacy did not publicly state their premise, but security concerns were most likely underlying.

6. IN WHAT OTHER CASES WERE THE EMPLOYEES OF THE EMBASSY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INVOLVED?

- Around 2008, Russian intelligence officers from the embassy conducted a campaign against the construction of a missile defence base on the Czech territory.³⁹
- In 2019, the Czech authorities (BIS, together with the National Centre against Organized Crime) dismantled the intelligence network created by the Russian FSB. According to the available information, the Russian embassy not only took part in this network's activities, but also partially financed the operations and transported the espionage equipment with their cars.⁴⁰
- In the spring of 2020, operatives working at the Russian embassy participated in Russia's aggressive escalation during the "Konev statue" case. As a result, two FSB members, Andrei Konchakov and Igor Rybakov, were deported in early June 2020.

37 Ruský novinář přišel v Polsku o povolení kvůli špionáži. Žil i v Česku, iDNES.cz, 25.10.2014, WWW: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/zahranicni/polsko-vyhodilo-ruskeho-novinare-sviridova.A141025_191014_zahranicni_fer

38 Ruští novináři přišli o akreditaci, iDNES.cz, 13.4.2016, WWW: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/zahranicni/rusti-novinari-prisli-o-akreditaci.A160413_204831_zahranicni_mlb

39 „Výroční zpráva o činnosti Vojenského zpravodajství za rok 2008,” VZ, přístup 20. 5. 2020, <https://vzcr.cz/uploads/41-Vyrocní-zpráva-2008.pdf>

40 „BIS a centrála proti organizovanému zločinu rozbily síť ruských zpravodajců,” Aktuálně, 21. 10. 2019, <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/bis-a-cetrala-proti-organizovanemu-zlocilu-loni-rozbyly-sit/r~66e17690f3e511e982ef0cc47ab5f122/>

8. HOW SHOULD THE CZECH GOVERNMENT REACT?⁴¹

- First, the government should **expel all Russian diplomats from Czech territory**, except for the Russian ambassador and his driver.
 - This step would maintain a formal diplomatic link with Moscow and, at the same time, virtually paralyze much of Russia's intelligence activities. The residuum left uncontrolled from the embassy would therefore remain with Russian espionage commanders. Czech and allied intelligence services could accordingly devote their attention to uncovering the remaining Russian operations.
- Secondly, in response, the Russian executive would reciprocally reduce the Czech diplomatic representation in Russia to zero. Here it is necessary to **realistically quantify the damages that the Czech Republic would suffer**:
 - In the area of formal diplomatic-political relations, we have nothing to lose, Czech diplomacy itself states that nothing would shift in Czech-Russian relations.
 - The Russian side would probably devastate the graves of Czechoslovak legionaries in Siberia, which is, unfortunately, happening anyway.
 - Consular assistance to Czech citizens in Russia could easily be taken over by one of our allies, which is a common practice.
 - The Czech economy is not dependent on trade with Russia. Business with Russia accounts for only 2% of our exports, so even if the Russian government decides to break these ties, the Czechia will not be damaged by it.
 - Škoda, the largest Czech business in Russia, operates within the Volkswagen Group. Should the Russian state decide to squeeze this German giant, it would have to strike against Germany, with which it is trying to build positive relations today because of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.
 - The current climate, in which Putin's Russia is sinking into increasing internal socio-economic problems, would be a pragmatically appropriate moment. The Czech government could support specific damaged Czech companies on a one-off basis so that they can move from Russia. Just as Japan is doing today when moving its companies from an increasingly hostile China.
 - » In short, it can be summarized that **Russia would lose a lot (its huge spy networks on Czech territory), while the Czechia would lose very little.**
- Step Three: The expected aggressive Russian response would be followed by negotiations on **the reoccupation of embassies for purely practical reasons**.
 - We should take Russian President Putin at his word when he calls for "diplomatic parity," gradually increasing the number of Russian diplomats in the Czech Republic and Czech officials in Russia on a one-to-one basis.
 - We should maintain sober, diligent control, according to Czech security institutions the power to monitor and call the shots on permissible Russian activities.

HAS ANYONE TAKEN SIMILAR STEPS?

- In 1971, the United Kingdom expelled 105 Soviet intelligence officers as part of Operation FOOT. According to the KGB⁴² or Oleg Gordievsky⁴³ archives, this move **destroyed Soviet intelligence operations in the UK for the next two decades**.

⁴¹ Taken from "How to cripple Russian espionage in the Czech Republic in one move", Aktuálně, 26.5.2020, <http://blog.aktualne.cz/blogy/pohled-zblizka.php?itemid=36948>

⁴² Mitrokhin Archive, more on WWW: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitrokhin_Archive

⁴³ The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War, Ben Macintyre, 2018, WWW: <https://www.amazon.com/Spy-Traitor-Greatest-Espionage-Story/dp/1101904194>